银行网络中的金融资产泡沫
Financial asset bubbles in banking networks
摘要:
我们考虑一个银行网络表示的随机微分方程的漂移耦合系统。我们假设一个核心-外围结构,核心银行持有泡沫资产。外围的银行无法直接接触到泡沫,但可以通过投资核心银行,从泡沫的增长中获得最初的好处。投资由链接的权重建模,链接的权重是银行稳健性的函数。以这种方式,在气泡的生长期间发生朝向核的优先附着机制。然后,我们研究如何扭曲的泡沫形状的网络,无论是有限的和无限大的系统,假设一个非零的影响的核心外围。由于泡沫的影响,银行不再独立,大数定律不能直接应用于极限。这导致扩散漂移中的一个项没有达到平均值,并且在爆发时增加了系统性风险。我们通过数值模拟来测试模型的这一特性。
英文摘要:
We consider a banking network represented by a system of stochastic differential equations coupled by their drift. We assume a core-periphery structure, and that the banks in the core hold a bubbly asset. The banks in the periphery have not direct access to the bubble, but can take initially advantage from its increase by investing on the banks in the core. Investments are modeled by the weight of the links, which is a function of the robustness of the banks. In this way, a preferential attachment mechanism towards the core takes place during the growth of the bubble. We then investigate how the bubble distort the shape of the network, both for finite and infinitely large systems, assuming a non vanishing impact of the core on the periphery. Due to the influence of the bubble, the banks are no longer independent, and the law of large numbers cannot be directly applied at the limit. This results in a term in the drift of the diffusions which does not average out, and that increases systemic risk at the moment of the burst. We test this feature of the model by numerical simulations.
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