竞争预测算法
Competing Prediction Algorithms
摘要:
预测是一项经过充分研究的机器学习任务,预测算法是在线产品和服务的核心组成部分。尽管它们在提供基于预测的产品的在线公司之间的竞争中处于中心地位,但预测算法的战略用途仍然未被探索。本文的目的是研究预测算法的战略使用。我们介绍了一种新的游戏理论设置,它是基于PAC学习框架,其中每个球员(又名预测算法在竞争中)寻求最大化的点的总和,它产生一个准确的预测和其他人没有。我们表明,旨在推广的算法可能会故意错过预测某些点,比其他人的期望更好。我们分析了经验博弈,即在给定样本上诱导的博弈,证明了它总是具有一个纯纳什均衡,并证明了每个更好反应的学习过程收敛。此外,我们的学习理论分析表明,玩家可以,以高概率,学习一个近似的纯纳什均衡的整个人口使用少量的样本。
英文摘要:
Prediction is a well-studied machine learning task, and prediction algorithms are core ingredients in online products and services. Despite their centrality in the competition between online companies who offer prediction-based products, the strategic use of prediction algorithms remains unexplored. The goal of this paper is to examine strategic use of prediction algorithms. We introduce a novel game-theoretic setting that is based on the PAC learning framework, where each player (aka a prediction algorithm at competition) seeks to maximize the sum of points for which it produces an accurate prediction and the others do not. We show that algorithms aiming at generalization may wittingly miss-predict some points to perform better than others on expectation. We analyze the empirical game, i.e. the game induced on a given sample, prove that it always possesses a pure Nash equilibrium, and show that every better-response learning process converges. Moreover, our learning-theoretic analysis suggests that players can, with high probability, learn an approximate pure Nash equilibrium for the whole population using a small number of samples.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。