通过退出游戏委派
Delegating via Quitting Games
摘要：
委派允许座席请求另一个座席完成任务。在许多情况下，任务可以向前委派，并且这个过程可以重复，直到它最终成功或不成功地执行。我们认为政策，以指导代理选择谁委托时，这种递归的相互作用是可能的。这些政策，基于退出游戏和多武装土匪，经验验证的有效性。我们的研究结果表明，退出游戏为基础的政策优于那些没有明确的递归性质的委托。
英文摘要：
Delegation allows an agent to request that another agent completes a task. In many situations the task may be delegated onwards, and this process can repeat until it is eventually, successfully or unsuccessfully, performed. We consider policies to guide an agent in choosing who to delegate to when such recursive interactions are possible. These policies, based on quitting games and multi-armed bandits, were empirically tested for effectiveness. Our results indicate that the quitting game based policies outperform those which do not explicitly account for the recursive nature of delegation.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
