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arXiv 1804.02556cs.CR
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对基于秩度量码方案的两种攻击:RankSign和基于身份的加密方案

Two attacks on rank metric code-based schemes: RankSign and an Identity-Based-Encryption scheme

Thomas Debris-Alazard, Jean-Pierre Tillich

摘要:

RankSign [GRSZ14a]是一种基于代码的签名方案,它是在NIST量子安全密码学竞赛中提出的[AGHRZ17],而且是新的基于身份的加密(IBE)[GHPT17a]的基本构建块。该签名方案是基于秩度量的,并且具有非常小的密钥大小,对于128位的预期安全级别,约为10Kbps。不幸的是,我们将证明[AGHRZ17]中为该方案提出的所有参数都可以被代数攻击破坏,该攻击利用了该方案中使用的增广LRPC码具有非常低的码字重量的事实。因此,如果没有RankSign,此时无法实例化IBE。作为第二个贡献,我们将表明,这个问题比在基于秩的密码学中找到一个新的签名更深入,我们还发现了一个攻击的通用问题,其安全性降低依赖。然而,与RankSign方案相反,似乎可以选择IBE方案的参数以避免我们的攻击。最后,我们还表明,如果用汉明度量代替[GHPT17a] IBE方案中的秩度量,则可以发现破坏性攻击。

英文摘要:

RankSign [GRSZ14a] is a code-based signature scheme proposed to the NIST competition for quantum-safe cryptography [AGHRZ17] and, moreover, is a fundamental building block of a new Identity-Based-Encryption (IBE) [GHPT17a]. This signature scheme is based on the rank metric and enjoys remarkably small key sizes, about 10KBytes for an intended level of security of 128 bits. Unfortunately we will show that all the parameters proposed for this scheme in [AGHRZ17] can be broken by an algebraic attack that exploits the fact that the augmented LRPC codes used in this scheme have very low weight codewords. Therefore, without RankSign the IBE cannot be instantiated at this time. As a second contribution we will show that the problem is deeper than finding a new signature in rank-based cryptography, we also found an attack on the generic problem upon which its security reduction relies. However, contrarily to the RankSign scheme, it seems that the parameters of the IBE scheme could be chosen in order to avoid our attack. Finally, we have also shown that if one replaces the rank metric in the [GHPT17a] IBE scheme by the Hamming metric, then a devastating attack can be found.

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