教育选择、劳动力市场匹配与工资
Schooling Choice, Labour Market Matching, and Wages
摘要:
我们开发了一个双边匹配模型的推理,在市场的一侧的代理人的特征是内生的,由于预匹配的投资。该模型可用于使用匹配的雇主-雇员数据的单一横截面来衡量劳动力市场摩擦的影响。所观察到的匹配工人的公司是一个离散的,双边的匹配过程中,企业的异质性偏好的教育顺序选择工人根据一个指数与工人的偏好,公司的结果。教育的分布在均衡中来自贝叶斯博弈:工人知道工人和企业类型的分布,在匹配过程之前投资于教育。虽然所观察到的匹配表现出很强的横截面依赖,由于匹配过程中,我们提出了一个渐进有效的推理过程,结合离散选择方法与模拟。
英文摘要:
We develop inference for a two-sided matching model where the characteristics of agents on one side of the market are endogenous due to pre-matching investments. The model can be used to measure the impact of frictions in labour markets using a single cross-section of matched employer-employee data. The observed matching of workers to firms is the outcome of a discrete, two-sided matching process where firms with heterogeneous preferences over education sequentially choose workers according to an index correlated with worker preferences over firms. The distribution of education arises in equilibrium from a Bayesian game: workers, knowing the distribution of worker and firm types, invest in education prior to the matching process. Although the observed matching exhibits strong cross-sectional dependence due to the matching process, we propose an asymptotically valid inference procedure that combines discrete choice methods with simulation.
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