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arXiv 1803.04646cs.AIcs.CR
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利用后门对SAT进行密码攻击的研究

On Cryptographic Attacks Using Backdoors for SAT

Matrosov Institute for System Dynamics and Control Theory SB RAS(俄罗斯科学院西伯利亚分院系统动力学与控制理论Matrosov研究所);Faculdade de Ciências, Universidade de Lisboa(里斯本大学科学学院);LASIGE(LASIGE研究单位)

Alexander Semenov, Oleg Zaikin, Ilya Otpuschennikov, Stepan Kochemazov, Alexey Ignatiev

摘要:

命题可满足性(SAT)是解决各种计算困难问题的最新方法的核心,其中之一就是密码分析。此外,SAT的许多实际应用只能通过识别和利用公式变量的子集(称为后门集)来有效地解决。本文提出了一类新的后门集SAT用于密码攻击的背景下,即猜测和确定攻击。我们的想法是确定最好的后门变量的统计估计硬度的猜测和确定攻击使用SAT求解器。著名的加密算法的削弱的变体上的实验结果表现出的优势,所提出的方法相比,最先进的估计硬度的猜测和确定的攻击。

英文摘要:

Propositional satisfiability (SAT) is at the nucleus of state-of-the-art approaches to a variety of computationally hard problems, one of which is cryptanalysis. Moreover, a number of practical applications of SAT can only be tackled efficiently by identifying and exploiting a subset of formula's variables called backdoor set (or simply backdoors). This paper proposes a new class of backdoor sets for SAT used in the context of cryptographic attacks, namely guess-and-determine attacks. The idea is to identify the best set of backdoor variables subject to a statistically estimated hardness of the guess-and-determine attack using a SAT solver. Experimental results on weakened variants of the renowned encryption algorithms exhibit advantage of the proposed approach compared to the state of the art in terms of the estimated hardness of the resulting guess-and-determine attacks.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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