通过税收控制易出错系统的人员利用
Controlling Human Utilization of Failure-Prone Systems via Taxes
AI总结：
本文研究了在具有行为风险偏好的决策者中，税收机制如何通过纳什均衡控制共享易出错系统的利用，探讨了异质性前景理论风险偏好可能导致非直观结果，并分析了税收率对系统利用的影响。
摘要：
我们考虑了一个博弈论模型，其中个体在共享的易出错系统或资源上竞争。我们研究了在决策者具有行为风险偏好（通过前景理论捕捉）的情况下，税收机制在纳什均衡下控制资源利用的有效性。我们首先观察到异质性前景理论风险偏好可能导致非直观结果。特别是对于表现出网络效应的资源，税收可能增加利用，并且可能不存在能够达到社会最优利用水平的税收率。我们识别出利用是单调且连续的条件，并进一步表征了通过适当选择税收率可以实现的利用范围。我们还显示，在合适假设下，当玩家被收取差异化税收时，资源利用比所有玩家收取相同税收时更高。
英文摘要：
We consider a game-theoretic model where individuals compete over a shared failure-prone system or resource. We investigate the effectiveness of a taxation mechanism in controlling the utilization of the resource at the Nash equilibrium when the decision-makers have behavioral risk preferences, captured by prospect theory. We first observe that heterogeneous prospect-theoretic risk preferences can lead to counter-intuitive outcomes. In particular, for resources that exhibit network effects, utilization can increase under taxation and there may not exist a tax rate that achieves the socially optimal level of utilization. We identify conditions under which utilization is monotone and continuous, and then characterize the range of utilizations that can be achieved by a suitable choice of tax rate. We further show that resource utilization is higher when players are charged differentiated tax rates compared to the case when all players are charged an identical tax rate, under suitable assumptions.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
