盲视：使用内置的全集成电感式稳压器对EM侧通道泄漏进行盲视
Blindsight: Blinding EM Side-Channel Leakage using Built-In Fully Integrated Inductive Voltage Regulator
摘要：
现代高性能以及功率受限的片上系统（SoC）越来越多地使用硬件加速加密引擎来保护计算、存储器访问和通信操作。芯片的电磁（EM）发射会泄露底层逻辑运算的信息，并且可以使用低成本的非侵入性测量来收集。基于EM的侧信道攻击（EMSCA）已成为SoC中加密引擎安全的主要威胁。本文提出了Blindsight的概念，其中高频感应电压调节器（IVR）与加密引擎集成在同一芯片上，以增加对EMSCA的抵抗能力。高频（~ 100 MHz）IVR存在于现代微处理器中，以提高能效。我们表明，IVR与随机控制回路（R-IVR）可以减少EMSCA的集成电感作为一个强大的EM发射器，并从加密引擎的EM发射的对手失明。EM测量在测试芯片上进行，该测试芯片包含两种由高频R-IVR驱动的128位高级加密标准（AES）引擎架构，并在两种攻击场景下进行，一种是对手获得目标设备的完全物理访问，另一种是对手仅在设备附近。在这两种攻击模式中，攻击者可以在基线IVR（B-IVR，无控制环随机化）中的测试向量泄漏评估（TVLA）测试中观察到信息泄漏。然而，我们表明，从R-IVR的EM发射致盲的攻击者，并显着降低了AES引擎的SCA漏洞。包括TVLA、相关电磁分析（CEMA）和基于模板的CEMA在内的一系列实际侧信道分析表明，R-IVR可以减少信息泄漏，并防止密钥提取，即使是针对熟练的对手。
英文摘要：
Modern high-performance as well as power-constrained System-on-Chips (SoC) are increasingly using hardware accelerated encryption engines to secure computation, memory access, and communication operations. The electromagnetic (EM) emission from a chip leaks information of the underlying logical operations and can be collected using low-cost non-invasive measurements. EM based side-channel attacks (EMSCA) have emerged as a major threat to security of encryption engines in a SoC. This paper presents the concept of Blindsight where a high-frequency inductive voltage regulator (IVR) integrated on the same chip with an encryption engine is used to increase resistance against EMSCA. High-frequency (~100MHz) IVRs are present in modern microprocessors to improve energy-efficiency. We show that an IVR with a randomized control loop (R-IVR) can reduce EMSCA as the integrated inductance acts as a strong EM emitter and blinds an adversary from EM emission of the encryption engine. The EM measurements are performed on a test-chip containing two architectures of a 128-bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) engine powered by a high-frequency R-IVR and under two attack scenarios, one, where an adversary gains complete physical access of the target device and the other, where the adversary is only in proximity of the device. In both attack modes, an adversary can observe information leakage in Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) test in a baseline IVR (B-IVR, without control loop randomization). However, we show that EM emission from the R-IVR blinds the attacker and significantly reduces SCA vulnerability of the AES engine. A range of practical side-channel analysis including TVLA, Correlation Electromagnetic Analysis (CEMA), and a template based CEMA shows that R-IVR can reduce information leakage and prevent key extraction even against a skilled adversary.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
