古诺双寡头市场中的合谋行为--来自实验经济学的证据
Algorithmic Collusion in Cournot Duopoly Market: Evidence from Experimental Economics
摘要：
共谋是当前人工智能时代的一个新兴概念。算法共谋是否是一个可信的威胁仍然是一个争论。在古诺双寡头竞争市场中，提出了一种能迫使竞争对手合谋的算法。实验结果表明，该算法能够成功地勒索人类竞争对手，获得更高的长期利润，同时人类竞争对手也会与该算法充分勾结。其结果是，社会福利迅速而稳定地下降。无论是在理论上还是在实验中，我们的工作都证实了算法共谋可能是一种可信的威胁。在应用中，我们希望，框架，算法设计以及在这项工作中所示的实验环境，可以为研究人员和政策制定者处理新兴的算法共谋的孵化器或测试床。
英文摘要：
Algorithmic collusion is an emerging concept in current artificial intelligence age. Whether algorithmic collusion is a creditable threat remains as an argument. In this paper, we propose an algorithm which can extort its human rival to collude in a Cournot duopoly competing market. In experiments, we show that, the algorithm can successfully extorted its human rival and gets higher profit in long run, meanwhile the human rival will fully collude with the algorithm. As a result, the social welfare declines rapidly and stably. Both in theory and in experiment, our work confirms that, algorithmic collusion can be a creditable threat. In application, we hope, the frameworks, the algorithm design as well as the experiment environment illustrated in this work, can be an incubator or a test bed for researchers and policymakers to handle the emerging algorithmic collusion.
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