多类平均场博弈用于阻止战场物联网中的错误信息传播(IoBT)
A Multiclass Mean-Field Game for Thwarting Misinformation Spread in the Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT)
摘要:
在本文中,错误信息传播的问题进行了研究的战场物联网(IoBT)系统中,攻击者试图注入虚假信息的IoBT节点,以妥协的IoBT操作。在所考虑的模型中,每个IoBT节点都试图通过找到接受给定信息的最佳概率来对抗错误信息攻击,从而在每个时刻最大限度地降低其成本。成本以所接收信息的质量以及感染成本来表示。该问题被公式化为具有多类代理的平均场博弈,其适合于对大规模异构IoBT系统进行建模。针对这一博弈,给出了平均场均衡的特征,并提出了一种基于前向-后向扫描法的平均场均衡求解算法。然后,考虑有限IoBT情况,并在有限的情况下的纳什均衡收敛到平均场均衡的条件。数值结果表明,与IoBT节点始终进行传输的基线方案相比,所提出的方案可以实现1.2倍的信息质量(QoI)提高。实验结果还表明,与基线相比,该方案可以将感染节点的比例降低99%。
英文摘要:
In this paper, the problem of misinformation propagation is studied for an Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) system in which an attacker seeks to inject false information in the IoBT nodes in order to compromise the IoBT operations. In the considered model, each IoBT node seeks to counter the misinformation attack by finding the optimal probability of accepting a given information that minimizes its cost at each time instant. The cost is expressed in terms of the quality of information received as well as the infection cost. The problem is formulated as a mean-field game with multiclass agents which is suitable to model a massive heterogeneous IoBT system. For this game, the mean-field equilibrium is characterized, and an algorithm based on the forward backward sweep method is proposed to find the mean-field equilibrium. Then, the finite IoBT case is considered, and the conditions of convergence of the Nash equilibria in the finite case to the mean-field equilibrium are presented. Numerical results show that the proposed scheme can achieve a 1.2-fold increase in the quality of information (QoI) compared to a baseline scheme in which the IoBT nodes are always transmitting. The results also show that the proposed scheme can reduce the proportion of infected nodes by 99% compared to the baseline.
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