分析并修补ISO/IEC中的SPEKE协议
Analysing and Patching SPEKE in ISO/IEC
AI总结:
本文分析ISO/IEC标准中的SPEKE协议,发现冒充和密钥可塑性两种新攻击,提出修补方案P-SPEKE并形式化验证,已被纳入2017年标准修订版。
摘要:
简单密码指数密钥交换(SPEKE)是一种知名的密码认证密钥交换(PAKE)协议,已被用于黑莓手机的安全消息传递以及Entrust的TruePass端到端Web产品中。它也被纳入国际标准,如ISO/IEC 11770-4和IEEE P1363.2。在本文中,我们分析了ISO/IEC和IEEE标准中规定的SPEKE协议。我们发现该协议容易受到两种新攻击:一种冒充攻击,允许攻击者通过与受害者启动两个并行会话,在不知道密码的情况下冒充用户;另一种密钥可塑性攻击,允许中间人(MITM)操纵会话密钥而不被最终用户检测到。这两种攻击都已被ISO/IEC SC 27技术委员会确认,ISO/IEC 11770-4也因此进行了修订。我们提出了一种修补后的SPEKE,称为P-SPEKE,并使用ProVerif在应用π演算中进行了形式化分析,以表明所提出的修补能防止这两种攻击。该修补已被纳入2017年发布的最新版ISO/IEC 11770-4修订版中。
英文摘要:
Simple Password Exponential Key Exchange (SPEKE) is a well-known Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) protocol that has been used in Blackberry phones for secure messaging and Entrust's TruePass end-to-end web products. It has also been included into international standards such as ISO/IEC 11770-4 and IEEE P1363.2. In this paper, we analyse the SPEKE protocol as specified in the ISO/IEC and IEEE standards. We identify that the protocol is vulnerable to two new attacks: an impersonation attack that allows an attacker to impersonate a user without knowing the password by launching two parallel sessions with the victim, and a key-malleability attack that allows a man-in-the-middle (MITM) to manipulate the session key without being detected by the end users. Both attacks have been acknowledged by the technical committee of ISO/IEC SC 27, and ISO/IEC 11770-4 revised as a result. We propose a patched SPEKE called P-SPEKE and present a formal analysis in the Applied Pi Calculus using ProVerif to show that the proposed patch prevents both attacks. The proposed patch has been included into the latest revision of ISO/IEC 11770-4 published in 2017.
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