ODINI:通过磁场从法拉第笼式空气间隙计算机中逃逸敏感数据
ODINI : Escaping Sensitive Data from Faraday-Caged, Air-Gapped Computers via Magnetic Fields
摘要:
气隙计算机是与Internet隔离的计算机,因为它们存储和处理敏感信息。当涉及到高度敏感的数据时,空气间隙计算机也可能被隔离在法拉第笼中。法拉第笼可以防止从各种计算机部件发出的电磁信号泄漏,这些信号可能会被远程窃听的对手拾取。气隙隔离与法拉第屏蔽相结合,提供了高水平的隔离,防止敏感数据从系统中泄漏。在本文中,我们展示了攻击者如何绕过法拉第笼和空气间隙,以便从高度安全的计算机中泄漏数据。我们的方法是基于利用计算机CPU产生的磁场。与电磁辐射(EMR)不同,低频磁辐射通过空气传播,穿透诸如法拉第笼(例如,指南针仍然在法拉第笼内工作)。我们介绍了一种代号为ODINI的恶意软件,它可以通过调节CPU内核的负载来控制受感染计算机发出的低频磁场。任意数据可以在磁发射的顶部调制和传输,并由放置在附近的磁接收器(窃听器)接收。我们提供技术背景并检查磁场的特性。我们实现了一个恶意软件原型,并讨论了设计考虑因素以及实施细节。我们还表明,恶意代码不需要特殊权限(例如,root),并且也可以从隔离的虚拟机(VM)中成功运行。
英文摘要:
Air-gapped computers are computers which are kept isolated from the Internet, because they store and process sensitive information. When highly sensitive data is involved, an air-gapped computer might also be kept secluded in a Faraday cage. The Faraday cage prevents the leakage of electromagnetic signals emanating from various computer parts, which may be picked up by an eavesdropping adversary remotely. The air-gap separation, coupled with the Faraday shield, provides a high level of isolation, preventing the potential leakage of sensitive data from the system. In this paper, we show how attackers can bypass Faraday cages and air-gaps in order to leak data from highly secure computers. Our method is based on an exploitation of the magnetic field generated by the computer CPU. Unlike electromagnetic radiation (EMR), low frequency magnetic radiation propagates though the air, penetrating metal shielding such as Faraday cages (e.g., compass still works inside Faraday cages). We introduce a malware code-named ODINI that can control the low frequency magnetic fields emitted from the infected computer by regulating the load of the CPU cores. Arbitrary data can be modulated and transmitted on top of the magnetic emission and received by a magnetic receiver (bug) placed nearby. We provide technical background and examine the characteristics of the magnetic fields. We implement a malware prototype and discuss the design considerations along with the implementation details. We also show that the malicious code does not require special privileges (e.g., root) and can successfully operate from within isolated virtual machines (VMs) as well.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。