走向现实的威胁建模：攻击商品化、无关漏洞和不现实的假设
Towards Realistic Threat Modeling: Attack Commodification, Irrelevant Vulnerabilities, and Unrealistic Assumptions
摘要：
当前的威胁模型通常考虑攻击者可以渗透系统的所有可能方式，并根据某些度量（例如，妥协时间）为每条路径分配概率。在本文中，我们将讨论这种观点如何阻碍当前威胁建模的技术（如攻击图）和战略（如博弈论）方法的真实性，并建议通过更仔细地观察攻击特征和攻击者环境来避开。我们使用一个玩具的ICS攻击的威胁模型，以显示如何从一个简单的分析攻击阶段和攻击者的局限性，攻击实例的现实视图可以出现。
英文摘要：
Current threat models typically consider all possible ways an attacker can penetrate a system and assign probabilities to each path according to some metric (e.g. time-to-compromise). In this paper we discuss how this view hinders the realness of both technical (e.g. attack graphs) and strategic (e.g. game theory) approaches of current threat modeling, and propose to steer away by looking more carefully at attack characteristics and attacker environment. We use a toy threat model for ICS attacks to show how a realistic view of attack instances can emerge from a simple analysis of attack phases and attacker limitations.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
