Tempest:随机系统中的时间动力学
Tempest: Temporal Dynamics in Anonymity Systems
摘要:
许多最近的匿名通信的建议忽略了他们的安全分析的时间对重要的系统组件的影响的考虑。在实践中,匿名系统的许多组成部分,如客户端位置和网络结构,随着时间的推移而显示出变化和模式。在本文中,我们专注于这种时间动态的匿名网络的安全性的影响。我们提出了Tempest,这是一套基于(1)客户端移动性,(2)使用模式和(3)底层网络路由变化的新型攻击。通过对真实世界数据集的实验分析,我们证明了这些时间攻击会降低各种匿名网络中的用户隐私,包括部署的系统,如Tor; Tor的路径选择协议,如DeNASA,TAPS和Counter-RAPTOR;以及用于互联网路由的网络层匿名协议,如Dovetail和HORNET。在某些情况下,退化程度惊人地严重。例如,单个主机故障或网络路由更改可以快速且高度确定地将客户端的ISP识别为恶意主机或ISP。每次攻击背后的对手都相对较弱-通常是被动的,控制着一个网络位置或少数主机。我们的研究结果表明,匿名系统的设计者在分析匿名性时应该严格考虑时间动态的影响。
英文摘要:
Many recent proposals for anonymous communication omit from their security analyses a consideration of the effects of time on important system components. In practice, many components of anonymity systems, such as the client location and network structure, exhibit changes and patterns over time. In this paper, we focus on the effect of such temporal dynamics on the security of anonymity networks. We present Tempest, a suite of novel attacks based on (1) client mobility, (2) usage patterns, and (3) changes in the underlying network routing. Using experimental analysis on real-world datasets, we demonstrate that these temporal attacks degrade user privacy across a wide range of anonymity networks, including deployed systems such as Tor; path-selection protocols for Tor such as DeNASA, TAPS, and Counter-RAPTOR; and network-layer anonymity protocols for Internet routing such as Dovetail and HORNET. The degradation is in some cases surprisingly severe. For example, a single host failure or network route change could quickly and with high certainty identify the client's ISP to a malicious host or ISP. The adversary behind each attack is relatively weak - generally passive and in control of one network location or a small number of hosts. Our findings suggest that designers of anonymity systems should rigorously consider the impact of temporal dynamics when analyzing anonymity.
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