等式理论下的见证函数证明
Secrecy by Witness-Functions under Equational Theories
摘要:
本文在非空方程理论下,利用隐函数分析了密码协议的保密性。安全函数是用于计算安全性的安全度量。一个具有安全功能的分析包括确保每个原子消息的安全性在协议中的生命周期内不会降低。在非空方程理论下,分析变得更加困难。事实上,入侵者可以利用密码原语的代数属性来导出秘密。这些性质是由于在密码系统和协议中使用数学函数,如乘法、加法、异或或模幂运算而产生的。在这里,我们展示了如何在非空的方程理论下使用密码函数,并在密码同态下对Needham-Schroeder-Lowe协议进行了分析。分析表明,虽然该协议在完美加密假设下是安全的,但在同态原语下是安全的。我们将展示如何的安全功能有助于说明它的攻击场景,我们提出了一个修正版本来修复它。
英文摘要:
In this paper, we use the witness-functions to analyze cryptographic protocols for secrecy under nonempty equational theories. The witness-functions are safe metrics used to compute security. An analysis with a witness-function consists in making sure that the security of every atomic message does not decrease during its lifecycle in the protocol. The analysis gets more difficult under nonempty equational theories. Indeed, the intruder can take advantage of the algebraic properties of the cryptographic primitives to derive secrets. These properties arise from the use of mathematical functions, such as multiplication, addition, exclusive-or or modular exponentiation in the cryptosystems and the protocols. Here, we show how to use the witness-functions under nonempty equational theories and we run an analysis on the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol under the cipher homomorphism. This analysis reveals that although this protocol is proved secure under the perfect encryption assumption, its security collapses under the homomorphic primitives. We show how the witness-functions help to illustrate an attack scenario on it and we propose an amended version to fix it.
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