Many of the benefits we derive from the Internet require trust in the authenticity of HTTPS connections. Unfortunately, the public key certification ecosystem that underwrites this trust has failed us on numerous occasions. Towards an exploration of the root causes we present an update to the common knowledge about the Certificate Authority (CA) ecosystem. Based on our findings the certificate ecosystem currently undergoes a drastic transformation. Big steps towards ubiquitous encryption were made, however, on the expense of trust for authentication of communication partners. Furthermore we describe systemic problems rooted in misaligned incentives between players in the ecosystem. We depict that proposed security extensions do not correctly realign these incentives. As such we argue that it is worth considering alternative methods of authentication. As a first step in this direction we propose an insurance-based mechanism and we demonstrate that it is technically feasible.
Evaluating Certificate Policy - Certification Practice Statement of Unique Government Certification Authority using Public Key Infrastructure Assessment Guidelines: Research in Progress
OSD PSE是印度尼西亚政府认证机构(CA),用于国家电子采购系统,后来被命名为OSD PSE G2。它在OSD Lemsaneg下具有独特的层次结构。OSD PSE G2作为颁发CA,发布并保证证书政策和认证实践声明(CP-CPS)的质量,以获得PKI用户的信任。本文分析了OSD PSE G2发布的CP-CPS 1.0版本。为此,我们采用PKI评估指南(PAG)的方法。本CP-CPS的质量评估,包括其对相关参考/标准的符合性,即:CP OSD Lemsaneg v.1.1; RFC 3647;以及CA关于信任服务原则和认证机构标准的商业惯例披露原则(BPDP-TSPCCA)版本2.0。我们最终发现CP-CPS 1.0版不符合相关标准和参考。因此,CP-CPS需要根据OSD PSE G2的当前条件进行更新。