犀牛角贬值的演化博弈模型
An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Model of Rhino Horn Devaluation
摘要:
由于对犀牛角的需求和随后的偷猎,犀牛数量处于临界水平。野生动物管理者试图通过使犀牛角贬值的方法来保护犀牛,其中最常见的方法是去角。博弈论已被用来研究偷猎者和野生动物管理者之间的互动,其中管理者可以“去角”他们的犀牛或留下角连接,偷猎者可能会表现得“有选择性”或“不加区别”。本文所描述的方法建立在以前的工作,并调查偷猎者之间的相互作用。我们建立了一个进化博弈模型,并确定哪种策略是首选的偷猎者在各种不同的人口偷猎者。这项工作的目的是发现是否存在鼓励偷猎者选择性行为的条件,即他们只杀死那些角完整的犀牛。分析结果表明,所有犀牛的全面贬值将可能导致不分青红皂白的偷猎。反过来,它表明,犀牛贬值只有在与强有力的抑制框架一起实施时才能有效。本文旨在为有关犀牛角贸易合法化的热烈辩论所需的必要研究做出贡献。
英文摘要:
Rhino populations are at a critical level due to the demand for rhino horn and the subsequent poaching. Wildlife managers attempt to secure rhinos with approaches to devalue the horn, the most common of which is dehorning. Game theory has been used to examine the interaction of poachers and wildlife managers where a manager can either `dehorn' their rhinos or leave the horn attached and poachers may behave `selectively' or `indiscriminately'. The approach described in this paper builds on this previous work and investigates the interactions between the poachers. We build an evolutionary game theoretic model and determine which strategy is preferred by a poacher in various different populations of poachers. The purpose of this work is to discover whether conditions which encourage the poachers to behave selectively exist, that is, they only kill those rhinos with full horns. The analytical results show that full devaluation of all rhinos will likely lead to indiscriminate poaching. In turn it shows that devaluing of rhinos can only be effective when implemented along with a strong disincentive framework. This paper aims to contribute to the necessary research required for informed discussion about the lively debate on legalising rhino horn trade.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。