arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1712.07464cs.GT
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自私未必是坏事

Selfishness need not be bad

Wu Zijun, Moehring Rolf H., Chen Yanyan, Xu Dachuan

摘要:

我们研究的价格无政府状态(PoA)在非原子拥塞游戏时,总需求$T$变得非常大。最近\cite{Colini2016On, Colini2017WINE, Colini2017arxiv}在路由博弈中获得了这个方向的第一个结果,并表明当总需求$T$的增长满足一定的规律性条件时,PoA收敛于1。我们扩展了他们的结果,通过开发一个\Wuuu{new}框架的极限分析\Wuuuu{the PoA that offers strong techniques such as the limit of games and applies to arbitrary growth patterns of $T$.} \Wuuu{We}表明,PoA收敛到1的极限游戏,无论类型的增长$T$的一大类成本函数,包含所有多项式和所有经常变化的功能。%路由游戏与BPR \Wuu{cost}功能,我们还表明,社会最优策略配置文件收敛到\Wuu{equilibria}在极限游戏,和PoA $=1+o(T^{-β})$,其中$β>0$是程度的\Wuu{BPR}功能。然而,精确的收敛速度关键取决于$T$的增长,这表明\cite{O2016Mechanisms}提出的猜想不一定成立。

英文摘要:

We investigate the price of anarchy (PoA) in non-atomic congestion games when the total demand $T$ gets very large. First results in this direction have recently been obtained by \cite{Colini2016On, Colini2017WINE, Colini2017arxiv} for routing games and show that the PoA converges to 1 when the growth of the total demand $T$ satisfies certain regularity conditions. We extend their results by developing a \Wuuu{new} framework for the limit analysis of \Wuuuu{the PoA that offers strong techniques such as the limit of games and applies to arbitrary growth patterns of $T$.} \Wuuu{We} show that the PoA converges to 1 in the limit game regardless of the type of growth of $T$ for a large class of cost functions that contains all polynomials and all regularly varying functions. % For routing games with BPR \Wuu{cost} functions, we show in addition that socially optimal strategy profiles converge to \Wuu{equilibria} in the limit game, and that PoA$=1+o(T^{-β})$, where $β>0$ is the degree of the \Wuu{BPR} functions. However, the precise convergence rate depends crucially on the the growth of $T$, which shows that a conjecture proposed by \cite{O2016Mechanisms} need not hold.

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