arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1711.04728cs.DCcs.GT
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复制作弊:平衡需要全球知识

Cheating by Duplication: Equilibrium Requires Global Knowledge

Yehuda Afek, Shaked Rafaeli, Moshe Sulamy

摘要:

什么全球信息必须分布理性代理先验知道的网络,以平衡是可能的问题进行了研究。到目前为止,带有理性代理的分布式算法都假设$n$,即网络的大小,是参与者先验已知的。我们调查上述问题,考虑不同的分布式计算问题,并显示多少每个代理必须先验知道$n$,以分布式算法是均衡的。在整个文件中考虑的主要工具是代理可以通过复制获得的优势-假装是一个以上的代理。我们首先证明,当没有约束的$n$是给定的平衡着色和知识共享是不可能的。%我们证明了当代理人没有先验知识的$n$,甚至是一个已知的界限,知识共享和着色的平衡是不可能的。我们提供了新的算法,这两个问题时,$n$ \emph{is}先验已知的所有代理,从而表明,有算法中,代理获得优势的唯一途径是重复。我们进一步表明,对于每个分布式问题有一个先验已知的范围,上界和下界的$n$,这样,如果实际的$n$是保证躺在该范围内,平衡是可能的。通过提供一个特定的范围内的均衡,和任何更大的范围内的不可能的结果,我们证明了平衡所需的紧范围:领导选举,知识共享,着色,分区和方向。

英文摘要:

The question of what global information must distributed rational agents a-priori know about the network in order for equilibrium to be possible is researched here. Until now, distributed algorithms with rational agents have assumed that $n$, the size of the network, is a-priori known to the participants. We investigate the above question, considering different distributed computing problems and showing how much each agent must a-priori know about $n$ in order for distributed algorithms to be equilibria. The main tool considered throughout the paper is the advantage an agent may gain by duplication- pretending to be more than one agent. We start by proving that when no bound on $n$ is given equilibrium for Coloring and Knowledge Sharing is impossible. %We prove that when agents have no a-priori knowledge on $n$, or even a known bound, equilibrium for both Knowledge Sharing and Coloring is impossible. We provide new algorithms for both problems when $n$ \emph{is} a-priori known to all agents, thus showing that there are algorithms in which the only way for an agent to gain an advantage is duplication. We further show that for each distributed problem there is an a-priori known range, an upper and a lower bound on $n$, such that if the actual $n$ is guaranteed to lay in that range, equilibrium is possible. By providing equilibria for a specific range, and impossibility results for any larger range, we prove the tight range necessary for equilibrium in: Leader Election, Knowledge Sharing, Coloring, Partition and Orientation.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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