用Letheia遗忘被遗忘的人,隐藏持久观察者的内容删除
Forgetting the Forgotten with Letheia, Concealing Content Deletion from Persistent Observers
摘要:
大多数社交平台都提供允许用户删除帖子的机制,很大一部分用户行使了被遗忘的权利。然而,具有讽刺意味的是,用户试图通过删除来减少对敏感帖子的关注,在实践中,吸引了专门针对这些帖子的跟踪者的不必要的关注。因此,删除可能使用户更容易受到对其隐私的攻击。希望让自己的帖子被遗忘的用户面临着一个“该死的,如果我这样做,该死的,如果我不”的困境。许多人正在转向像Snapchat这样短暂的社交平台,这将剥夺我们重要的用户数据存档。在间歇性的撤退的形式,我们提出,忘忧,一个新的解决方案,这个问题的遗忘被遗忘的。如果下一代社交平台愿意放弃一小部分未删除帖子的不间断可用性,Lethe会在很长一段时间内为已删除帖子提供隐私。在Lethe存在的情况下,敌对观察者变得不确定一些帖子是否被Lethe永久删除或只是暂时撤回;同时,敌对观察者被大量错误标记的未删除帖子淹没。为了证明Lethe的可行性和性能,我们分析了Twitter上用户删除的大规模真实数据,并深入研究了如何选择持续时间分布,以便在临时撤回和未删除帖子的复活之间交替。我们发现,在不同的设置,用户行使他们的删除权的隐私,可用性和对抗性开销之间的一个有利的权衡。我们发现,即使面对能够不间断地访问整个平台的最终对手,Lethe也可以从删除时起提供长达3个月的删除隐私,同时保持高达95%的内容可用性,并将对抗精度保持在20%。
英文摘要:
Most social platforms offer mechanisms allowing users to delete their posts, and a significant fraction of users exercise this right to be forgotten. However, ironically, users' attempt to reduce attention to sensitive posts via deletion, in practice, attracts unwanted attention from stalkers specifically to those posts. Thus, deletions may leave users more vulnerable to attacks on their privacy in general. Users hoping to make their posts forgotten face a "damned if I do, damned if I don't" dilemma. Many are shifting towards ephemeral social platform like Snapchat, which will deprive us of important user-data archival. In the form of intermittent withdrawals, we present, Lethe, a novel solution to this problem of forgetting the forgotten. If the next-generation social platforms are willing to give up the uninterrupted availability of non-deleted posts by a very small fraction, Lethe provides privacy to the deleted posts over long durations. In presence of Lethe, an adversarial observer becomes unsure if some posts are permanently deleted or just temporarily withdrawn by Lethe; at the same time, the adversarial observer is overwhelmed by a large number of falsely flagged undeleted posts. To demonstrate the feasibility and performance of Lethe, we analyze large-scale real data about users' deletion over Twitter and thoroughly investigate how to choose time duration distributions for alternating between temporary withdrawals and resurrections of non-deleted posts. We find a favorable trade-off between privacy, availability and adversarial overhead in different settings for users exercising their right to delete. We show that, even against an ultimate adversary with an uninterrupted access to the entire platform, Lethe offers deletion privacy for up to 3 months from the time of deletion, while maintaining content availability as high as 95% and keeping the adversarial precision to 20%.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。