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arXiv 1710.08705cs.CRcs.OS
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Tails & Tor和其他保护在线活动的工具

Tails & Tor and other tools for Safeguarding Online Activities

Stephanie Abraham, Tyler Silva, Robert Decourcy, Jim Cardon

摘要:

目前还没有太多已知的方法来打破Tor匿名性,而且它们需要大量的计算能力。控制入口和出口节点允许攻击者通过足够的模式分析来危害客户端IP。如果.onion或公共网站不使用SSL,则信息到达出口节点后将不会加密。Tor已经被卡内基梅隆大学成功破解,但他们不会回答问题,也不会确认他们的方法。这篇研究论文调查了Tails & Tor和其他保护在线活动的工具。

英文摘要:

There are not many known ways to break Tor anonymity, and they require an enormous amount of computational power. Controlling both entrance and exit nodes allows an attacker to compromise client IP with enough pattern analysis. If an .onion or public website does not use SSL, information will not be encrypted once it reaches the exit node. Tor has been successfully broken by Carnegie Mellon, however they will not answer questions nor confirm their method. This research paper investigates Tails & Tor and other tools for Safeguarding Online Activities.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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