隐藏时钟:模拟控制器区域网络中的时钟偏差
Cloaking the Clock: Emulating Clock Skew in Controller Area Networks
摘要:
自动驾驶汽车配备了电子控制单元(ECU),通过车载网络协议标准(如控制器局域网(CAN))进行通信。这些协议的设计假设是,将车内通信与外部网络分离足以防止网络攻击。然而,这种假设已经被最近的攻击证明是无效的,在这些攻击中,对手能够渗透到车载网络。受这些攻击的启发,已经提出了用于车载网络的入侵检测系统(IDS),该入侵检测系统试图通过使用诸如ECU的时钟偏差的属性利用设备指纹来检测攻击。在本文中,我们提出了伪装攻击,一个智能伪装攻击中,对手修改发送消息的时间,以匹配目标ECU的时钟偏差。该攻击利用了这样一个事实,即虽然时钟偏差是每个ECU的物理属性,不能被对手改变,但其他ECU对时钟偏差的估计是基于网络流量的,而网络流量仅是网络组件,可以被对手修改。我们实现了建议的伪装攻击,并测试了两个IDS,即,目前国家的最先进的IDS和一个新的IDS,我们开发的基础上广泛使用的网络时间协议(NTP)。我们在两个硬件测试平台上实现了伪装攻击,一个原型和一个真实的联网车辆,并表明它总是可以欺骗两个IDS。我们还引入了一个新的度量标准,称为最大松弛指数来量化伪装攻击的有效性,即使对手无法精确匹配目标ECU的时钟偏差。
英文摘要:
Automobiles are equipped with Electronic Control Units (ECU) that communicate via in-vehicle network protocol standards such as Controller Area Network (CAN). These protocols are designed under the assumption that separating in-vehicle communications from external networks is sufficient for protection against cyber attacks. This assumption, however, has been shown to be invalid by recent attacks in which adversaries were able to infiltrate the in-vehicle network. Motivated by these attacks, intrusion detection systems (IDSs) have been proposed for in-vehicle networks that attempt to detect attacks by making use of device fingerprinting using properties such as clock skew of an ECU. In this paper, we propose the cloaking attack, an intelligent masquerade attack in which an adversary modifies the timing of transmitted messages in order to match the clock skew of a targeted ECU. The attack leverages the fact that, while the clock skew is a physical property of each ECU that cannot be changed by the adversary, the estimation of the clock skew by other ECUs is based on network traffic, which, being a cyber component only, can be modified by an adversary. We implement the proposed cloaking attack and test it on two IDSs, namely, the current state-of-the-art IDS and a new IDS that we develop based on the widely-used Network Time Protocol (NTP). We implement the cloaking attack on two hardware testbeds, a prototype and a real connected vehicle, and show that it can always deceive both IDSs. We also introduce a new metric called the Maximum Slackness Index to quantify the effectiveness of the cloaking attack even when the adversary is unable to precisely match the clock skew of the targeted ECU.
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