绑架模型：Selten博弈的推广
Kidnapping Model: An Extension of Selten's Game
摘要：
塞尔滕博弈是一个绑架模型，其中捕获绑架者的概率与人质是否被释放或处决无关。通常情况下，鉴于所涉问题的高度敏感性，如果人质已被处决，当局会投入更多的精力和资源抓捕绑架者，而不是支付赎金以确保人质获释。本文研究了绑架者被抓获的概率取决于人质是否被处决的非对称博弈，并在Selten博弈中找到了一个新的唯一确定的完美均衡点。
英文摘要：
Selten's game is a kidnapping model where the probability of capturing the kidnapper is independent of whether the hostage has been released or executed. Most often, in view of the elevated sensitivities involved, authorities put greater effort and resources into capturing the kidnapper if the hostage has been executed, in contrast to the case when a ransom is paid to secure the hostage's release. In this paper, we study the asymmetric game when the probability of capturing the kidnapper depends on whether the hostage has been executed or not and find a new uniquely determined perfect equilibrium point in Selten's game.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
