身份，Haecceity和哥斯拉问题
Identity, Haecceity, and the Godzilla Problem
摘要：
在标准的一阶谓词逻辑中，通常认为$a=a$是对任何项$a$的定理。很容易证明，这使得能够明显证明一个定理，说明任何实体的存在。这个令人尴尬的结果是自由逻辑的构造的动机，但是在大多数正统的一阶逻辑的恒等式处理中，它通常被忽略。我们调查的可能性，这个问题可以避免放弃的规则，$a=a$是一个定理，而不是要求它被视为一个全球性的，但在原则上可废止的假设有关的对象域的话语。我们建议，任何这样做的逻辑都被称为“开放的”。我们回顾了物理学、哲学和文学中质疑自我同一性的经典概念的一些动机，我们表明卡尔纳普的“空对象”在任何自我同一性可能受到质疑的谓词逻辑系统中都有一个自然的作用。
英文摘要：
In standard first order predicate logic with identity it is usually taken that $a=a$ is a theorem for any term $a$. It is easily shown that this enables the apparent proof of a theorem stating the existence of any entity whatsoever. This embarrassing result is a motivation for the construction of free logics, but in most orthodox treatments of first order logic with identity it is generally dealt with by being ignored. We investigate the possibility that this problem can be obviated by dropping the rule that $a=a$ is a theorem and requiring instead that it be treated as a global but in principle defeasible assumption about the objects in the domain of discourse. We propose that any logic in which this is done be called "open." We review some motivations in physics, philosophy, and literature for questioning the classical notion of self-identity, and we show that Carnap's "null object" has a natural role to play in any system of predicate logic where self-identity can come into question.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
