Coq和Isabelle中的一个纳什均衡存在定理
An Existence Theorem of Nash Equilibrium in Coq and Isabelle
摘要:
纳什均衡(NE)是博弈论中的一个核心概念。在这里,我们正式证明了一个已发表的定理存在一个NE在两个证明助手,Coq和Isabelle:从一个游戏开始,许多结果,一个可以得到一个游戏重写这些结果与两个基本的结果,即玩家1胜或玩家2胜。如果所有推导出这种赢/输博弈的方法都导致一个博弈中有一个参与者有获胜策略,那么原始博弈也有一个纳什均衡。这篇文章做了三个其他的贡献:第一,虽然原来的证明调用严格偏序的线性扩展,在这里我们通过推广相关的定义来避免它。其次,我们注意到,该定理还意味着存在一个安全的平衡点,一个更强的版本的NE,模型检验。第三,我们还注意到,该定理的构造性证明在准多项式时间内计算了非零和优先博弈(广义奇偶博弈)的安全均衡。
英文摘要:
Nash equilibrium (NE) is a central concept in game theory. Here we prove formally a published theorem on existence of an NE in two proof assistants, Coq and Isabelle: starting from a game with finitely many outcomes, one may derive a game by rewriting each of these outcomes with either of two basic outcomes, namely that Player 1 wins or that Player 2 wins. If all ways of deriving such a win/lose game lead to a game where one player has a winning strategy, the original game also has a Nash equilibrium. This article makes three other contributions: first, while the original proof invoked linear extension of strict partial orders, here we avoid it by generalizing the relevant definition. Second, we notice that the theorem also implies the existence of a secure equilibrium, a stronger version of NE that was introduced for model checking. Third, we also notice that the constructive proof of the theorem computes secure equilibria for non-zero-sum priority games (generalizing parity games) in quasi-polynomial time.
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