具有相关payoff matrix的随机演化对策的内部均衡期望数
On the expected number of internal equilibria in random evolutionary games with correlated payoff matrix
摘要:
随机博弈中平衡点的分析在进化对策论中引起了极大的兴趣,对于理解动力系统的复杂性,例如其行为、文化或生物多样性具有重要意义。到目前为止,分析主要集中在独立支付条目的随机游戏上。在本文中,我们克服了这个限制性的假设,考虑多人的两个战略的进化博弈的支付矩阵的条目是相关的随机变量。利用随机多项式理论的技巧,我们建立了一个内部(稳定)平衡点平均数的闭公式。然后,我们将这个重要的量的渐近行为,为大集团的大小和研究的相关性的影响。我们的研究结果表明,降低收益之间的相关性(即,一个战略家为不同的群体组成)导致更大的(稳定)平衡点的平均数,这表明系统或人口的行为多样性,可以通过增加独立性的收益条目。数值结果支持所得到的分析结果。
英文摘要:
The analysis of equilibrium points in random games has been of great interest in evolutionary game theory, with important implications for understanding of complexity in a dynamical system, such as its behavioural, cultural or biological diversity. The analysis so far has focused on random games of independent payoff entries. In this paper, we overcome this restrictive assumption by considering multi-player two-strategy evolutionary games where the payoff matrix entries are correlated random variables. Using techniques from the random polynomial theory we establish a closed formula for the mean numbers of internal (stable) equilibria. We then characterise the asymptotic behaviour of this important quantity for large group sizes and study the effect of the correlation. Our results show that decreasing the correlation among payoffs (namely, of a strategist for different group compositions) leads to larger mean numbers of (stable) equilibrium points, suggesting that the system or population behavioural diversity can be promoted by increasing independence of the payoff entries. Numerical results are provided to support the obtained analytical results.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。