arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1707.08763cs.AIcs.LO
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贝叶斯认识论与基于叙事的司法事实认定方法

Reconciling Bayesian Epistemology and Narration-based Approaches to Judiciary Fact-finding

Ghent University(根特大学);University of Gdansk(格但斯克大学)

Rafal Urbaniak

摘要:

法律概率主义主张,司法事实认定中的信念度应当以标准的信念认识论中的信念度为模型。古典法律或然论(CLP)补充说,如果证据表明有罪的可信度高于适当的有罪概率阈值,则定罪是合理的。这些观点受到各种质疑,特别是受到所谓叙述方法的支持者的质疑,根据这种方法,实况调查人员的决定是对所发生事件的相互竞争的叙述之间动态相互作用的结果。我开发了一种方法,一个婴儿的认识论可以使意义的叙事方法。我这样做是通过制定一个概率框架来评估竞争的叙事方面的正式解释的非正式评价标准中使用的叙事方法。

英文摘要:

Legal probabilism (LP) claims the degrees of conviction in juridical fact-finding are to be modeled exactly the way degrees of beliefs are modeled in standard bayesian epistemology. Classical legal probabilism (CLP) adds that the conviction is justified if the credence in guilt given the evidence is above an appropriate guilt probability threshold. The views are challenged on various counts, especially by the proponents of the so-called narrative approach, on which the fact-finders' decision is the result of a dynamic interplay between competing narratives of what happened. I develop a way a bayesian epistemologist can make sense of the narrative approach. I do so by formulating a probabilistic framework for evaluating competing narrations in terms of formal explications of the informal evaluation criteria used in the narrative approach.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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