解耦IFTTT:限制物联网触发行动平台中的干扰
Decoupled-IFTTT: Constraining Privilege in Trigger-Action Platforms for the Internet of Things
摘要:
触发-动作平台是一种新兴的基于网络的系统,它使用户能够创建形式为"如果有烟雾报警器,请关闭我的烤箱"的自动化规则(或食谱)。"这些平台通过代表用户获取OAuth令牌,将各种在线服务(包括物联网设备、社交网络和生产力工具)整合在一起。不幸的是,这些平台也带来了长期的安全风险:如果它们受到损害,攻击者可以滥用属于数百万用户的OAuth令牌来任意操纵他们的设备和数据。在这项工作中,我们首先量化了用户在IFTTT(If-This-Then-That)背景下面临的风险。我们使用半自动化的工具,我们建立了克服IFTTT的闭源性质和在线服务API不一致的挑战,IFTTT的基于OAuth-based授权模型进行第一次实证分析。我们发现,75%的IFTTT渠道(在线服务的抽象)使用特权过高的OAuth令牌,从而增加了发生妥协时的风险。即使OAuth令牌被正确地授予特权,IFTTT的妥协也无法阻止它们的滥用。出于这种实证分析的动机,我们设计和评估解耦IFTTT(dIFTTT),第一个商家行动平台,用户不必给它高度特权访问他们的在线服务。我们的设计将细粒度OAuth令牌的概念推向了极致,并确保即使云服务被攻击者控制,它也不能滥用OAuth令牌来调用未经授权的操作。我们的评估确定,dIFTTT构成适度的开销:它增加了不到15毫秒的延迟配方执行时间,并减少了2.5%的吞吐量。
英文摘要:
Trigger-Action platforms are an emerging class of web-based systems that enable users to create automation rules (or recipes) of the form, "If there is a smoke alarm, then turn off my oven." These platforms stitch together various online services including Internet of Things devices, social networks, and productivity tools by obtaining OAuth tokens on behalf of users. Unfortunately, these platforms also introduce a long-term security risk: If they are compromised, the attacker can misuse the OAuth tokens belonging to millions of users to arbitrarily manipulate their devices and data. In this work, we first quantify the risk users face in the context of If-This-Then-That (IFTTT). We perform the first empirical analysis of the OAuth-based authorization model of IFTTT using semi-automated tools that we built to overcome the challenges of IFTTT's closed source nature and of online service API inconsistencies. We find that 75% of IFTTT's channels, an abstraction of online services, use overprivileged OAuth tokens, increasing risks in the event of a compromise. Even if the OAuth tokens were to be privileged correctly, IFTTT's compromise will not prevent their misuse. Motivated by this empirical analysis, we design and evaluate Decoupled-IFTTT (dIFTTT), the first trigger-action platform where users do not have to give it highly-privileged access to their online services. Our design pushes the notion of fine-grained OAuth tokens to its extreme and ensures that even if the cloud service is controlled by the attacker, it cannot misuse the OAuth tokens to invoke unauthorized actions. Our evaluation establishes that dIFTTT poses modest overhead: it adds less than 15ms of latency to recipe execution time, and reduces throughput by 2.5%.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。