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arXiv 1706.10165math.COmath.GR
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打破集体决策中的联系

Breaking ties in collective decision making

Daniela Bubboloni, Michele Gori

摘要:

许多经典的社会偏好(多赢家社会选择)对应关系只有在考虑两个备选方案和一个奇数个体时才是确定的。因此,他们通常承认几个坚决的改进,其中每一个自然被解释为一个打破平局的规则。在本文中,我们找到了条件,使社会偏好(多赢家社会选择)对应承认一个坚决的细化满足适当的弱版本的匿名性和中立性原则,以及反转对称性(免疫力的反转偏见)。

英文摘要:

Many classical social preference (multiwinner social choice) correspondences are resolute only when two alternatives and an odd number of individuals are considered. Thus, they generally admit several resolute refinements, each of them naturally interpreted as a tie-breaking rule. In this paper we find out conditions which make a social preference (multiwinner social choice) correspondence admit a resolute refinement fulfilling suitable weak versions of the anonymity and neutrality principles, as well as reversal symmetry (immunity to the reversal bias).

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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