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arXiv 1706.08182eess.SYcs.SY
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利用移动目标方法检测控制系统中的完整性攻击

Detecting Integrity Attacks on Control Systems using a Moving Target Approach

Carnegie Mellon University(卡内基梅隆大学)

Sean Weerakkody, Bruno Sinopoli

AI总结:

本文提出利用未知时间变化动态来检测同时试图识别系统并注入隐蔽输出的攻击者,通过引入依赖于控制系统状态的外部状态和传感器来实现检测。

摘要:

在存在完整性攻击的情况下维持控制系统的安全性是一个重大挑战。文献中已提出几种可能的攻击,包括重放、虚假数据注入和零动力学攻击。检测和预防这些攻击可能需要防御者拥有特定的可信通信通道子集。或者,通过保持系统模型对攻击者保密来防止这些攻击。本文考虑一个能够修改和读取所有传感器和执行器通道的攻击者。为了对抗该攻击者,我们引入依赖于控制系统状态的外部状态,其具有未知于攻击者的线性时间变化动态。我们还包含传感器来测量这些状态。未知时间变化动态的存在被用来检测同时试图识别系统并注入隐蔽输出的攻击者。潜在的攻击策略和对攻击者性能的界限被提供。

英文摘要:

Maintaining the security of control systems in the presence of integrity attacks is a significant challenge. In literature, several possible attacks against control systems have been formulated including replay, false data injection, and zero dynamics attacks. The detection and prevention of these attacks may require the defender to possess a particular subset of trusted communication channels. Alternatively, these attacks can be prevented by keeping the system model secret from the adversary. In this paper, we consider an adversary who has the ability to modify and read all sensor and actuator channels. To thwart this adversary, we introduce external states dependent on the state of the control system, with linear time-varying dynamics unknown to the adversary. We also include sensors to measure these states. The presence of unknown time-varying dynamics is leveraged to detect an adversary who simultaneously aims to identify the system and inject stealthy outputs. Potential attack strategies and bounds on the attacker's performance are provided.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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