无信息传递的冲突升级单决策者策略
Single Equalizer Strategy with no Information Transfer for Conflict Escalation
摘要：
在重复的二人博弈中，例如囚徒困境或雪堆博弈，存在迫使对手的收益相等的策略。这些均衡器策略形成了更一般的零决定策略的子集，这些策略单方面设定对手的回报。试图理解这些策略在动物行为进化中的作用的一个挑战是在交配机会或领土控制的斗争中缺乏迭代。我们发现，任意的两个参数的战略可能具有相应的均衡器策略，产生相同的结果：统计的战斗结果在与突变体的比赛是相同的，这两个战略。因此，如果自然界确实将复杂的策略减少（边缘化）到均衡器策略空间，那么仅分析均衡器策略空间可能足以预测动物行为。这项工作的主要发现是，有一个独特的均衡器策略，预测没有相互合作的战斗结果。缺乏相互合作是冲突升级竞赛中的一个共同特点，通常需要一个明确的赢家。此外，这种独特的策略不评估对手的状态信息。该方法绕过了进化稳定性的标准分析。研究结果很好地符合男性碗和daily蜘蛛之间的战斗观察和支持消耗战模型的经验假设，该物种只使用有关自己的状态在冲突升级的信息。
英文摘要：
In an iterated two-person game, for instance prisoner's dilemma or the snowdrift game, there exist strategies that force the payoffs of the opponents to be equal. These equalizer strategies form a subset of the more general zero-determinant strategies that unilaterally set the payoff of an opponent. A challenge in the attempts to understand the role of these strategies in the evolution of animal behavior is the lack of iterations in the fights for mating opportunities or territory control. We show that an arbitrary two-parameter strategy may possess a corresponding equalizer strategy which produces the same result: statistics of the fight outcomes in the contests with mutants are the same for each of these two strategies. Therefore, analyzing only the equalizer strategy space may be sufficient to predict animal behavior if nature, indeed, reduces (marginalizes) complex strategies to equalizer strategy space. The work's main finding is that there is a unique equalizer strategy that predicts fight outcomes without mutual cooperation. The lack of mutual cooperation is a common trait in conflict escalation contests that generally require a clear winner. In addition this unique strategy does not assess information of the opponent's state. The method bypasses the standard analysis of evolutionary stability. The results fit well the observations of combat between male bowl and doily spiders and support an empirical assumption of the war of attrition model that the species use only information regarding their own state during conflict escalation.
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