测量RPKI路由验证和过滤采用的严格方法
Towards a Rigorous Methodology for Measuring Adoption of RPKI Route Validation and Filtering
摘要：
一个提高路由安全性的建议--路由源授权（ROA）--已经被标准化。ROA指定允许哪个网络通告一组Internet目的地。虽然一些网络现在指定了ROA，但很少有人知道其他网络是否会根据这些ROA检查它们收到的路由，这一过程称为路由源验证（Route Origin Validation，简称ROA）。哪些网络盲目接受无效路由？而他们，又是如何否认的呢？如果存在替代方案，哪些人会取消对他们的偏好？最近的分析试图使用非受控实验来表征通过比较有效路线和无效路线来确定采用。然而，我们认为，获得一个坚实的理解，采用新技术是不可能的，使用目前可用的数据集和技术。我们的测量结果表明，虽然一些互联网服务提供商没有观察到使用无效的路由在不受控制的实验中，他们实际上是使用不同的路由（非安全）流量工程的目的，而不执行路由。最后，我们描述了一个控制的，可验证的方法来测量的可扩展性，并提出了三个AS，实现可扩展性，由运营商确认。
英文摘要：
A proposal to improve routing security---Route Origin Authorization (ROA)---has been standardized. A ROA specifies which network is allowed to announce a set of Internet destinations. While some networks now specify ROAs, little is known about whether other networks check routes they receive against these ROAs, a process known as Route Origin Validation (ROV). Which networks blindly accept invalid routes? Which reject them outright? Which de-preference them if alternatives exist? Recent analysis attempts to use uncontrolled experiments to characterize ROV adoption by comparing valid routes and invalid routes. However, we argue that gaining a solid understanding of ROV adoption is impossible using currently available data sets and techniques. Our measurements suggest that, although some ISPs are not observed using invalid routes in uncontrolled experiments, they are actually using different routes for (non-security) traffic engineering purposes, without performing ROV. We conclude with a description of a controlled, verifiable methodology for measuring ROV and present three ASes that do implement ROV, confirmed by operators.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
