arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1705.01302math.OCecon.GNmath.PRq-fin.EC
收藏

一个 McKean-Vlasov 方法用于分布式电力发电发展

A McKean-Vlasov approach to distributed electricity generation development

Université Paris Dauphine(巴黎第九大学);University of California, Berkeley(加州大学伯克利分校);EDF R&D(法国电力集团研发部);LPSM, Université Paris Diderot(巴黎第七大学概率统计实验室);CREST-ENSAE(国家经济统计与管理学院经济研究中心)

René Aïd, Matteo Basei, Huyên Pham

AI总结:

本文研究了集中式碳排放技术和分布式间歇非排放技术之间的相互作用,通过 McKean-Vlasov 控制问题分析了投资决策,并探讨了社会规划者视角下碳税和传输成本对分布式发电容量的长期影响。

摘要:

本文分析了集中式碳排放技术和分布式间歇非排放技术之间的相互作用。在我们的模型中,存在一个代表性消费者,她可以通过投资分布式发电(太阳能板)和从集中式公司购买电力来满足电力需求。分布式发电具有间歇性,并对消费者产生外部成本。公司提供非随机的电力生成,受碳税和传输成本的限制。消费者的目的是在满足需求的同时最小化投资成本、支付给公司的费用和间歇性成本。公司的目标是满足消费者的剩余需求,同时最小化投资成本、需求偏差成本,并最大化从消费者获得的付款。我们将投资决策表述为具有随机系数的 McKean-Vlasov 控制问题。我们提供了每个玩家面临最优决策问题的显式、价格模型无关的解决方案,以及帕累托最优和Stackelberg均衡(公司为领导者)的解。我们发现,从社会规划者的角度来看,碳税或传输成本对于在长期内证明分布式容量的积极份额是必要的,无论两种技术的投资成本如何。Stackelberg 均衡远离帕累托均衡,并导致对分布式能源的过度投资以及集中式能源价格显著升高。

英文摘要:

This paper analyses the interaction between centralised carbon emissive technologies and distributed intermittent non-emissive technologies. In our model, there is a representative consumer who can satisfy her electricity demand by investing in distributed generation (solar panels) and by buying power from a centralised firm at a price the firm sets. Distributed generation is intermittent and induces an externality cost to the consumer. The firm provides non-random electricity generation subject to a carbon tax and to transmission costs. The objective of the consumer is to satisfy her demand while mini\-mising investment costs, payments to the firm and intermittency costs. The objective of the firm is to satisfy the consumer's residual demand while minimising investment costs, demand deviation costs, and maximising the payments from the consumer. We formulate the investment decisions as McKean-Vlasov control problems with stochastic coefficients. We provide explicit, price model-free solutions to the optimal decision problems faced by each player, the solution of the Pareto optimum, and the Stackelberg equilibrium where the firm is the leader. We find that, from the social planner's point of view, the carbon tax or transmission costs are necessary to justify a positive share of distributed capacity in the long-term, whatever the respective investment costs of both technologies are. The Stackelberg equilibrium is far from the Pareto equilibrium and leads to an over-investment in distributed energy and to a much higher price for centralised energy.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑