分歧机制设计--从最佳单一税制到改善癌症治疗
Bifurcation Mechanism Design -- From Optimal Flat Taxes to Improved Cancer Treatments
摘要：
系统参数的微小变化会导致其行为的突然定性变化，这种现象称为分叉。这种不稳定性通常被认为是有问题的，但是，我们表明，他们的权力可以利用设计新型的机制。滞后机制利用系统参数的瞬时变化，通过最佳平衡选择来引起其性能的永久改善。最优控制机制导致收敛到性能甚至优于最佳平衡的状态。我们应用这些机制在两个不同的设置，说明分叉机制设计的多功能性。在第一部分中，我们探讨了引入单一税收如何通过破坏无效率均衡来改善社会福利，尽管降低了代理人的“理性”。从那里，我们继续考虑一个众所周知的肿瘤代谢游戏，并使用我们的方法来获得新的癌症治疗策略。
英文摘要：
Small changes to the parameters of a system can lead to abrupt qualitative changes of its behavior, a phenomenon known as bifurcation. Such instabilities are typically considered problematic, however, we show that their power can be leveraged to design novel types of mechanisms. Hysteresis mechanisms use transient changes of system parameters to induce a permanent improvement to its performance via optimal equilibrium selection. Optimal control mechanisms induce convergence to states whose performance is better than even the best equilibrium. We apply these mechanisms in two different settings that illustrate the versatility of bifurcation mechanism design. In the first one we explore how introducing flat taxation can improve social welfare, despite decreasing agent "rationality", by destabilizing inefficient equilibria. From there we move on to consider a well known game of tumor metabolism and use our approach to derive novel cancer treatment strategies.
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