理解规范变化：进化博弈论方法（扩展版）
Understanding Norm Change: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Approach (Extended Version)
摘要：
世界各地的人类社会通过发展和维持社会规范而相互作用，了解这些规范是如何产生和变化的至关重要。在这项工作中，我们定义了一个进化博弈论模型来研究规范如何在社会中变化，基于这样的想法，即不同的力量在社会中的规范转化为不同的博弈论的互动结构和激励。我们使用这个模型来研究，无论是分析和广泛的基于代理的模拟，在一个社会中的协调需要的进化关系（这与其规范强度有关），规范变化有两个关键方面：文化惰性（当面临需要改变规范的条件时，人口是否或多快作出反应），探索率（Agent尝试新策略的意愿）。我们的研究结果表明，高协调需要导致高文化惯性和低探索率，而低协调需要导致低文化惯性和高探索率。据我们所知，这是第一个工作，了解这些因素之间的进化因果关系。
英文摘要：
Human societies around the world interact with each other by developing and maintaining social norms, and it is critically important to understand how such norms emerge and change. In this work, we define an evolutionary game-theoretic model to study how norms change in a society, based on the idea that different strength of norms in societies translate to different game-theoretic interaction structures and incentives. We use this model to study, both analytically and with extensive agent-based simulations, the evolutionary relationships of the need for coordination in a society (which is related to its norm strength) with two key aspects of norm change: cultural inertia (whether or how quickly the population responds when faced with conditions that make a norm change desirable), and exploration rate (the willingness of agents to try out new strategies). Our results show that a high need for coordination leads to both high cultural inertia and a low exploration rate, while a low need for coordination leads to low cultural inertia and high exploration rate. This is the first work, to our knowledge, on understanding the evolutionary causal relationships among these factors.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
