稳定分散电网的电力市场设计比较
Comparison of electricity market designs for stable decentralized power grids
摘要：
在这项研究中，我们开发了一个理论模型的战略均衡报价和定价行为的异质性和有限理性的电力生产商和电网运营商在一个单一的电力市场下的不确定信息的生产能力和电力需求。我们比较了八种不同的市场设计变量和几个水平的集中式电力生产，影响生产者在电网中的空间分布，他们的单位生产和削减成本，以及他们的生产能力的平均值和标准差。我们的市场设计变体在三个方面有所不同。生产者或者得到他们各自的投标价格（“按投标价格支付”），或者得到电网运营商设定的（较高的）市场价格（“统一定价”）。他们要么按其投标数量（“要求付款”），要么按其实际供应量（“供应付款”）付款，由于生产的不确定性，两者可能有所不同。最后，过剩的生产要么需要削减，要么可以供应给电网。总的来说，我们发现统一定价，支付所需的金额，并要求削减在许多方面表现最好或第二好的组合，并提供低经济成本，低消费者成本，正利润，低平衡，低工作量和诚实的投标行为的目标之间的最佳折衷。
英文摘要：
In this study, we develop a theoretical model of strategic equilibrium bidding and price-setting behaviour by heterogeneous and boundedly rational electricity producers and a grid operator in a single electricity market under uncertain information about production capabilities and electricity demand. We compare eight different market design variants and several levels of centralized electricity production that influence the spatial distribution of producers in the grid, their unit production and curtailment costs, and the mean and standard deviation of their production capabilities. Our market design variants differ in three aspects. Producers are either paid their individual bid price ("pay as bid") or the (higher) market price set by the grid operator ("uniform pricing"). They are either paid for their bid quantity ("pay requested") or for their actual supply ("pay supplied") which may differ due to production uncertainty. Finally, excess production is either required to be curtailed or may be supplied to the grid. Overall, we find the combination of uniform pricing, paying for requested amounts, and required curtailment to perform best or second best in many respects, and to provide the best compromise between the goals of low economic costs, low consumer costs, positive profits, low balancing, low workload, and honest bidding behaviour.
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