从危险分析中论证安全案例:一种模块化论证模式
Arguing from Hazard Analysis in Safety Cases: A Modular Argument Pattern
AI总结:
本文提出一种基于危险分析结果和安全措施设计的模块化论证模式,以提高安全论证的可信度,并探讨其在正式分析和计算机辅助构建安全案例中的应用。
摘要:
我们观察到安全论证容易过于抽象,例如解决方案指的是大型包,论证策略指的是复杂的推理步骤,上下文和假设缺乏可追溯性。这些问题会降低我们对这些论证所需的信心。在本文中,我们研究了如何从(i)危险分析(HA)结果和(ii)安全措施的设计,即两者都用于信心评估来构建可信的论证。我们提出一种整合三种HA技术,即FTA、FMEA和STPA,以及这些分析结果的反应,即安全需求和设计增量的论证模式。我们提供了一个例子,说明我们的模式如何帮助构建论证,并讨论了使用该模式进行正式分析和计算机辅助构建安全案例的步骤。
英文摘要:
We observed that safety arguments are prone to stay too abstract, e.g. solutions refer to large packages, argument strategies to complex reasoning steps, contexts and assumptions lack traceability. These issues can reduce the confidence we require of such arguments. In this paper, we investigate the construction of confident arguments from (i) hazard analysis (HA) results and (ii) the design of safety measures, i.e., both used for confidence evaluation. We present an argument pattern integrating three HA techniques, i.e., FTA, FMEA, and STPA, as well as the reactions on the results of these analyses, i.e., safety requirements and design increments. We provide an example of how our pattern can help in argument construction and discuss steps towards using our pattern in formal analysis and computer-assisted construction of safety cases.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。