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arXiv 1704.03508q-bio.NC
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社会交往中的风险与心理状态转换模型

A Model of Risk and Mental State Shifts during Social Interaction

Andreas Hula, Iris Vilares, Peter Dayan, P. Read Montague

摘要:

在重复的微观经济博弈中,人类参与者之间的合作和竞争为社会现象提供了一个强有力的窗口,例如信任的建立,破裂和修复。这提供了对患有社会衰弱状况(例如边缘性人格障碍)的受试者群体的特别洞察的前景。然而,虽然存在一个合适的基础,这种游戏的定量分析,即交互式部分可观测马尔可夫决策过程(I-POMDP),计算的考虑,迄今限制了其应用。在这里,我们改进了I-POMDPs在一个典型的信任游戏中的推理,从而突出和解决两个以前未建模的现象:一种形式的社会风险规避所表现出的球员谁是在游戏中的互动控制,和双方球员表现出的刺激或愤怒。当合作伙伴明显背叛时,愤怒就会产生,这会导致合作的突然破裂。如果不能对伴侣的性倾向进行建模,就会导致严重的经济效率低下。我们使用从大量健康志愿者和患者的游戏中获得的证据来说明这些行为。

英文摘要:

Cooperation and competition between human players in repeated microeconomic games offer a powerful window onto social phenomena such as the establishment, breakdown and repair of trust. This offers the prospect of particular insight into populations of subjects suffering from socially-debilitating conditions such as borderline personality disorder. However, although a suitable foundation for the quantitative analysis of such games exists, namely the Interactive Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (I-POMDP), computational considerations have hitherto limited its application. Here, we improve inference in I-POMDPs in a canonical trust game, and thereby highlight and address two previously unmodelled phenomena: a form of social risk-aversion exhibited by the player who is in control of the interaction in the game, and irritation or anger exhibited by both players. Irritation arises when partners apparently defect, and it causes a precipitate breakdown in cooperation. Failing to model one's partner's propensity for it leads to substantial economic inefficiency. We illustrate these behaviours using evidence drawn from the play of large cohorts of healthy volunteers and patients.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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