面向攻击容忍网络：并发多路径路由和蝴蝶网络
Towards Attack-Tolerant Networks: Concurrent Multipath Routing and the Butterfly Network
摘要：
众所周知，针对网络基础设施的有针对性的攻击很难防范。就通信网络而言，这种攻击可能使用户容易受到审查和监视，即使使用加密技术也是如此。现有的大部分网络容错工作都集中在随机故障上，而不适用于对抗性故障（攻击）。根据定义，集中式网络具有单点故障，导致分散式架构和协议越来越受欢迎，以实现更大的容错能力。然而，即使协议是分散的，也可能出现集中式网络结构。尽管它们的协议是去中心化的，但互联网和万维网在理论上和历史上都被证明非常容易受到攻击，部分原因是新兴的结构集中化。当存在单点故障时，它们可能容易受到非技术性（即，胁迫性）攻击，这表明对攻击容忍采取结构性办法的重要性。我们展示了部分信任传递性的假设，而更现实的假设基础网络的信任，可以用来量化的网络作为一个功能的信任传递性的有效冗余。我们还证明了有效的冗余的环绕蝶形拓扑结构的信任传递性呈指数级增加，并描述了一种新的并发多路径路由算法构建路径，利用冗余。当网络结构的一部分可以决定我们的结果可以用来创建可扩展的，攻击容忍的基础设施。更一般地说，我们的研究结果提供了一个理论形式主义评估对抗容错网络结构的影响。
英文摘要：
Targeted attacks against network infrastructure are notoriously difficult to guard against. In the case of communication networks, such attacks can leave users vulnerable to censorship and surveillance, even when cryptography is used. Much of the existing work on network fault-tolerance focuses on random faults and does not apply to adversarial faults (attacks). Centralized networks have single points of failure by definition, leading to a growing popularity in decentralized architectures and protocols for greater fault-tolerance. However, centralized network structure can arise even when protocols are decentralized. Despite their decentralized protocols, the Internet and World-Wide Web have been shown both theoretically and historically to be highly susceptible to attack, in part due to emergent structural centralization. When single points of failure exist, they are potentially vulnerable to non-technological (i.e., coercive) attacks, suggesting the importance of a structural approach to attack-tolerance. We show how the assumption of partial trust transitivity, while more realistic than the assumption underlying webs of trust, can be used to quantify the effective redundancy of a network as a function of trust transitivity. We also prove that the effective redundancy of the wrap-around butterfly topology increases exponentially with trust transitivity and describe a novel concurrent multipath routing algorithm for constructing paths to utilize that redundancy. When portions of network structure can be dictated our results can be used to create scalable, attack-tolerant infrastructures. More generally, our results provide a theoretical formalism for evaluating the effects of network structure on adversarial fault-tolerance.
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