arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1703.04873cs.SI
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社交网络中去匿名化风险的量化

Quantification of De-anonymization Risks in Social Networks

Wei-Han Lee, Changchang Liu, Shouling Ji, Prateek Mittal, Ruby Lee

摘要:

发布隐私敏感数据的风险最近受到了相当大的关注。已经提出了几种去匿名化攻击来重新识别个人,即使应用了数据匿名化技术。然而,目前还没有理论上的量化相关的数据效用,是由匿名化技术和数据的脆弱性,以防止去匿名化攻击。在本文中,我们从理论上分析了去匿名化攻击,并提供了条件的效用的匿名数据(表示为匿名效用),以实现成功的去匿名化。据我们所知,这是第一个量化匿名效用和去匿名能力之间关系的工作。与以前的工作不同,我们的量化分析不需要对图模型进行假设,从而为开发实用的去匿名化/匿名化技术提供了一般的理论指导。此外,我们评估了对现实世界Facebook数据集的最先进的去匿名化攻击,以显示以前工作的局限性。通过比较这些实验结果和我们分析中理论上可实现的去匿名化能力,我们进一步证明了以前的去匿名化攻击的无效性和未来更强大的去匿名化攻击的潜力。

英文摘要:

The risks of publishing privacy-sensitive data have received considerable attention recently. Several de-anonymization attacks have been proposed to re-identify individuals even if data anonymization techniques were applied. However, there is no theoretical quantification for relating the data utility that is preserved by the anonymization techniques and the data vulnerability against de-anonymization attacks. In this paper, we theoretically analyze the de-anonymization attacks and provide conditions on the utility of the anonymized data (denoted by anonymized utility) to achieve successful de-anonymization. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work on quantifying the relationships between anonymized utility and de-anonymization capability. Unlike previous work, our quantification analysis requires no assumptions about the graph model, thus providing a general theoretical guide for developing practical de-anonymization/anonymization techniques. Furthermore, we evaluate state-of-the-art de-anonymization attacks on a real-world Facebook dataset to show the limitations of previous work. By comparing these experimental results and the theoretically achievable de-anonymization capability derived in our analysis, we further demonstrate the ineffectiveness of previous de-anonymization attacks and the potential of more powerful de-anonymization attacks in the future.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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