非法药物市场中的声誉动态
Reputation Dynamics in a Market for Illicit Drugs
摘要:
我们分析了声誉动态的在线市场的非法药物使用一种新的数据集的价格和评级。市场是一个黑市,因此合同无法执行。我们研究的作用,声誉发挥在减轻逆向选择在这个市场。我们记录了以下程式化的事实:(i)价格和卖方评级之间存在正相关关系。这种影响在留给卖家的评论数量上正在增加。一个成熟的高评级卖家收取的价格比一个成熟的低评级卖家高20%。(ii)拥有更多评论的卖家收取更高的价格,无论评级如何。(iii)低评级卖家更有可能退出市场,减少销售。我们发现,这些程式化的事实解释的动态模型的逆向选择,评级和退出,其中买方形成理性的推理,卖方的质量共同从他的评级和销售数量。获得低评级的卖家最初收取与高评级卖家相同的价格,因为早期评论对质量的信息较少。坏卖家退出,而不是面对未来更低的价格。我们提供的条件下,我们的模型承认一个唯一的均衡。我们估计模型,并使用结果来计算在市场上的声誉回报。我们发现,如果没有评级系统,市场将由于逆向选择而崩溃。
英文摘要:
We analyze reputation dynamics in an online market for illicit drugs using a novel dataset of prices and ratings. The market is a black market, and so contracts cannot be enforced. We study the role that reputation plays in alleviating adverse selection in this market. We document the following stylized facts: (i) There is a positive relationship between the price and the rating of a seller. This effect is increasing in the number of reviews left for a seller. A mature highly-rated seller charges a 20% higher price than a mature low-rated seller. (ii) Sellers with more reviews charge higher prices regardless of rating. (iii) Low-rated sellers are more likely to exit the market and make fewer sales. We show that these stylized facts are explained by a dynamic model of adverse selection, ratings, and exit, in which buyers form rational inferences about the quality of a seller jointly from his rating and number of sales. Sellers who receive low ratings initially charge the same price as highly-rated sellers since early reviews are less informative about quality. Bad sellers exit rather than face lower prices in the future. We provide conditions under which our model admits a unique equilibrium. We estimate the model, and use the result to compute the returns to reputation in the market. We find that the market would have collapsed due to adverse selection in the absence of a rating system.
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