基于移动代理的真实传递机制
Truthful Mechanisms for Delivery with Mobile Agents
摘要：
我们研究了博弈论的任务，选择移动代理提供多个项目在网络上。一个实例由$m$消息（物理对象）和$k$移动异构代理给出，这些消息必须在加权无向图中的指定源-目标对之间传输，每个移动异构代理都能够一次传输一个消息。根据[Bärtschi et al. 2016]的最新模型，每个代理$i$消耗的能量与它在图中行进的距离成比例，其中不同的能量消耗率由权重因子$w_i$给出。我们感兴趣的是优化或近似所有选定的代理的总能耗。与以往的研究不同，我们假设权重是私有值只知道各自的代理。我们提出了三种不同的机制，选择，路由和支付的代理人在一个真实的方式，保证自愿参与的代理人，而近似的最佳能源消耗的一个常数的因素。为此，我们分析了以前的结构结果和[Bärtschi et al. 2017]给出的近似算法。最后，我们表明，在某些情况下，在一个单一的包的情况下，付款的总和可以有界的最佳。
英文摘要：
We study the game-theoretic task of selecting mobile agents to deliver multiple items on a network. An instance is given by $m$ messages (physical objects) which have to be transported between specified source-target pairs in a weighted undirected graph, and $k$ mobile heterogeneous agents, each being able to transport one message at a time. Following a recent model by [Bärtschi et al. 2016], each agent $i$ consumes energy proportional to the distance it travels in the graph, where the different rates of energy consumption are given by weight factors $w_i$. We are interested in optimizing or approximating the total energy consumption over all selected agents. Unlike previous research, we assume the weights to be private values known only to the respective agents. We present three different mechanisms which select, route and pay the agents in a truthful way that guarantees voluntary participation of the agents, while approximating the optimum energy consumption by a constant factor. To this end we analyze a previous structural result and an approximation algorithm given by [Bärtschi et al. 2017]. Finally, we show that for some instances in the case of a single package, the sum of the payments can be bounded in terms of the optimum.
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