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arXiv 1702.06436cs.CRcs.GT
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基于契约理论的关键基础设施保护资源分配

Contract-Theoretic Resource Allocation for Critical Infrastructure Protection

AbdelRahman Eldosouky, Walid Saad, Charles Kamhoua, and Kevin Kwiat

摘要:

关键基础设施保护(CIP)被认为是未来十年最具挑战性的安全问题之一。CIP中的一个关键挑战是向具有不同脆弱性和关键性级别的关键基础设施分配资源(人员或网络)的能力。在这项工作中,提出了一个契约理论的方法来解决的资源分配的关键基础设施与非对称信息的问题。控制中心(CC)用于设计合同并将其提供给基础设施的所有者。合约可以被看作是CC与基础设施之间的协议,CC使用该协议来分配资源并获得回报。合同的设计是为了使CC的利益最大化,并激励每个基础设施接受合同并获得适当的资源来保护它。安全结构由CC未知的脆弱性级别和关键性级别定义。因此,每个基础设施都可以声称它是最脆弱的或最关键的,以获得更多的资源。一种新的机制来处理这种不对称的信息,同时提供最优的合同,激励每个基础设施,以揭示其实际类型。在信息不对称的条件下,这种资源分配合同的必要条件和充分条件。仿真结果表明,所提出的合同理论的方法最大限度地提高了CC的效用,同时确保没有基础设施有动机要求另一个合同,尽管在CC缺乏确切的信息。

英文摘要:

Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) is envisioned to be one of the most challenging security problems in the coming decade. One key challenge in CIP is the ability to allocate resources, either personnel or cyber, to critical infrastructures with different vulnerability and criticality levels. In this work, a contract-theoretic approach is proposed to solve the problem of resource allocation in critical infrastructure with asymmetric information. A control center (CC) is used to design contracts and offer them to infrastructures' owners. A contract can be seen as an agreement between the CC and infrastructures using which the CC allocates resources and gets rewards in return. Contracts are designed in a way to maximize the CC's benefit and motivate each infrastructure to accept a contract and obtain proper resources for its protection. Infrastructures are defined by both vulnerability levels and criticality levels which are unknown to the CC. Therefore, each infrastructure can claim that it is the most vulnerable or critical to gain more resources. A novel mechanism is developed to handle such an asymmetric information while providing the optimal contract that motivates each infrastructure to reveal its actual type. The necessary and sufficient conditions for such resource allocation contracts under asymmetric information are derived. Simulation results show that the proposed contract-theoretic approach maximizes the CC's utility while ensuring that no infrastructure has an incentive to ask for another contract, despite the lack of exact information at the CC.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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