从Ash中恢复轨迹:在聚合移动数据中保留用户隐私NOT
Trajectory Recovery From Ash: User Privacy Is NOT Preserved in Aggregated Mobility Data
摘要:
在过去的十年里,人类移动数据已经通过蜂窝网络和移动应用程序被广泛收集,并公开发布用于学术研究和商业目的。由于发布个人的移动记录通常会引起隐私问题,因此数据集所有者倾向于仅发布聚合的移动数据,例如在特定时间戳由蜂窝塔覆盖的用户数量,这被认为足以保护用户的隐私。然而,在本文中,我们认为,并证明,即使发布聚合的移动数据可能会导致个人的轨迹隐私泄露。我们开发了一个攻击系统,该系统能够利用人类移动的独特性和规律性,在没有任何先验知识的情况下,从聚合的移动数据中恢复个人的轨迹。通过对移动应用和蜂窝网络的两个真实数据集进行实验,我们发现该攻击系统能够在数万到数十万用户规模下恢复用户轨迹,准确率约为73%~91%,这表明此类数据集存在严重的隐私泄漏。通过对聚合移动数据的调查,我们的工作认识到发布统计数据中存在的一个新的隐私问题,呼吁学术界和工业界立即关注。
英文摘要:
Human mobility data has been ubiquitously collected through cellular networks and mobile applications, and publicly released for academic research and commercial purposes for the last decade. Since releasing individual's mobility records usually gives rise to privacy issues, datasets owners tend to only publish aggregated mobility data, such as the number of users covered by a cellular tower at a specific timestamp, which is believed to be sufficient for preserving users' privacy. However, in this paper, we argue and prove that even publishing aggregated mobility data could lead to privacy breach in individuals' trajectories. We develop an attack system that is able to exploit the uniqueness and regularity of human mobility to recover individual's trajectories from the aggregated mobility data without any prior knowledge. By conducting experiments on two real-world datasets collected from both mobile application and cellular network, we reveal that the attack system is able to recover users' trajectories with accuracy about 73%~91% at the scale of tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands users, which indicates severe privacy leakage in such datasets. Through the investigation on aggregated mobility data, our work recognizes a novel privacy problem in publishing statistic data, which appeals for immediate attentions from both academy and industry.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。