arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1702.03965cs.CR
收藏

连接点:通过写入访问模式到主存储器的隐私泄漏

Connecting the Dots: Privacy Leakage via Write-Access Patterns to the Main Memory

Tara Merin John, Syed Kamran Haider, Hamza Omar, Marten van Dijk

摘要:

应用程序对不可信存储系统的数据相关访问模式因泄漏有关用户数据的敏感信息而臭名昭著。以前的研究已经表明,能够监视向内存发出的读写请求的攻击者如何将它们与应用程序相关联,以了解其敏感数据。然而,仅通过写访问模式的信息泄漏是不太明显的,在当前的文献中没有得到很好的研究。在这项工作中,我们演示了一个实际的攻击电源侧信道抗蒙哥马利的阶梯为基础的模幂算法中常用的公钥密码学。我们推断出完整的512位秘密指数在$\sim3.5$分钟凭借的只是写访问模式的算法的主存储器。为了学习受害者算法的写访问模式在现实的设置下,我们利用一个妥协的DMA设备采取频繁的应用程序的地址空间的快照,然后对这些快照运行一个简单的差分分析,以找到写访问序列。该攻击已在基于英特尔酷睿(TM)i7-4790 3.60GHz处理器的系统上显示。我们进一步讨论了一个可能的攻击McEliece公钥密码系统,也利用写访问模式来学习的秘密密钥。

英文摘要:

Data-dependent access patterns of an application to an untrusted storage system are notorious for leaking sensitive information about the user's data. Previous research has shown how an adversary capable of monitoring both read and write requests issued to the memory can correlate them with the application to learn its sensitive data. However, information leakage through only the write access patterns is less obvious and not well studied in the current literature. In this work, we demonstrate an actual attack on power-side-channel resistant Montgomery's ladder based modular exponentiation algorithm commonly used in public key cryptography. We infer the complete 512-bit secret exponent in $\sim3.5$ minutes by virtue of just the write access patterns of the algorithm to the main memory. In order to learn the victim algorithm's write access patterns under realistic settings, we exploit a compromised DMA device to take frequent snapshots of the application's address space, and then run a simple differential analysis on these snapshots to find the write access sequence. The attack has been shown on an Intel Core(TM) i7-4790 3.60GHz processor based system. We further discuss a possible attack on McEliece public-key cryptosystem that also exploits the write-access patterns to learn the secret key.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑