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arXiv 1701.04895cs.AIcs.SIstat.ML
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不可知的操纵者:社交网络策展人算法

Unknowable Manipulators: Social Network Curator Algorithms

University of Oxford(牛津大学)

Samuel Albanie, Hillary Shakespeare, Tom Gunter

摘要:

社交网络服务要想获得并留住用户,就必须找到让他们保持参与的方法。通过准确衡量他们的偏好,它能够为他们提供可用内容的子集,从而最大限度地提高网站的收入。如果没有适当的监管框架的约束,我们认为,一个足够复杂的策展人算法负责执行这一过程可能会选择探索策展策略,是不利于用户。特别是,我们认为这样的算法能够学习操纵其用户,有几个定性的原因:1。对大量用户数据的访问,加上机器学习领域的不断突破,正在为大规模决策制定强大但无法解释的策略。2.有效的反馈机制的可用性,用于评估短期和长期用户对策展策略的反应。3.来自强化学习的技术允许机器在抽象层面上学习自动化和高度成功的策略,通常会导致非直观但高度适当的动作选择。在这项工作中,我们认为,这些策略的用户操纵可能采取的形式和审查的作用,监管应该在设计这样的系统。

英文摘要:

For a social networking service to acquire and retain users, it must find ways to keep them engaged. By accurately gauging their preferences, it is able to serve them with the subset of available content that maximises revenue for the site. Without the constraints of an appropriate regulatory framework, we argue that a sufficiently sophisticated curator algorithm tasked with performing this process may choose to explore curation strategies that are detrimental to users. In particular, we suggest that such an algorithm is capable of learning to manipulate its users, for several qualitative reasons: 1. Access to vast quantities of user data combined with ongoing breakthroughs in the field of machine learning are leading to powerful but uninterpretable strategies for decision making at scale. 2. The availability of an effective feedback mechanism for assessing the short and long term user responses to curation strategies. 3. Techniques from reinforcement learning have allowed machines to learn automated and highly successful strategies at an abstract level, often resulting in non-intuitive yet nonetheless highly appropriate action selection. In this work, we consider the form that these strategies for user manipulation might take and scrutinise the role that regulation should play in the design of such systems.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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