Dandelion：重新设计比特币网络以实现安全
Dandelion: Redesigning the Bitcoin Network for Anonymity
摘要：
在过去的十年里，比特币和其他加密货币的受欢迎程度激增。虽然比特币并不声称为其用户提供匿名性，但它享有公众对“保护隐私”金融系统的看法。实际上，加密货币以明文形式发布用户的整个交易历史，尽管是以假名发布的;这是交易验证所必需的。因此，如果用户的假名可以与他们的人类身份相关联，那么隐私的影响可能会很大。最近，研究人员展示了利用比特币网络的点对点（P2P）网络协议中的弱点进行的去匿名攻击。特别是，P2P网络目前以结构化的方式转发内容，允许观察者对用户进行去匿名化。在这项工作中，我们重新设计的P2P网络的第一原则，提供强大的，可证明的匿名性保证的目标。我们提出了一个简单的网络策略，称为Danvanse，它实现了近乎最佳的匿名保证，以最小的成本，网络的效用。我们还提供了一个实际的实现Danvet。
英文摘要：
Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies have surged in popularity over the last decade. Although Bitcoin does not claim to provide anonymity for its users, it enjoys a public perception of being a `privacy-preserving' financial system. In reality, cryptocurrencies publish users' entire transaction histories in plaintext, albeit under a pseudonym; this is required for transaction validation. Therefore, if a user's pseudonym can be linked to their human identity, the privacy fallout can be significant. Recently, researchers have demonstrated deanonymization attacks that exploit weaknesses in the Bitcoin network's peer-to-peer (P2P) networking protocols. In particular, the P2P network currently forwards content in a structured way that allows observers to deanonymize users. In this work, we redesign the P2P network from first principles with the goal of providing strong, provable anonymity guarantees. We propose a simple networking policy called Dandelion, which achieves nearly-optimal anonymity guarantees at minimal cost to the network's utility. We also provide a practical implementation of Dandelion.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
