arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1612.04773math.OC
收藏

连续巡逻和隐藏游戏

Continuous Patrolling and Hiding Games

Tristan Garrec

摘要:

我们提出了两个零和对策建模的情况下,一个球员的攻击(或隐藏在)有限维非空紧集,和其他试图阻止攻击(或找到他)。第一个游戏,称为巡逻游戏,对应于这种情况下的一个动态公式,在这个意义上,攻击者选择一个时间和一个攻击点,巡逻者选择一个连续的轨迹,以最大限度地提高在给定时间内找到攻击点的概率。而第二个游戏,称为隐藏游戏,对应于一个静态的公式,其中,两个间谍和隐藏者同时选择一个点和间谍最大化的概率是在距离小于一个给定的阈值的隐藏者。

英文摘要:

We present two zero-sum games modeling situations where one player attacks (or hides in) a finite dimensional nonempty compact set, and the other tries to prevent the attack (or find him). The first game, called patrolling game, corresponds to a dynamic formulation of this situation in the sense that the attacker chooses a time and a point to attack and the patroller chooses a continuous trajectory to maximize the probability of finding the attack point in a given time. Whereas the second game, called hiding game, corresponds to a static formulation in which both the searcher and the hider choose simultaneously a point and the searcher maximizes the probability of being at distance less than a given threshold of the hider.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑