arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1611.07580cs.NI
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基于人群感知空间统计的无线电制图定价机制

Pricing Mechanisms for Crowd-Sensed Spatial-Statistics-Based Radio Mapping

Xuhang Ying, Sumit Roy, Radha Poovendran

摘要:

在空白空间上联网(即,本地未使用的频谱)依赖于对频谱使用的主动监视。基于经验无线电传播模型的频谱数据库被广泛采用,但容易出错,因为它们不考虑树木和人造建筑物等建筑环境。作为一种经济上可行的选择,人群感知无线电测绘从移动用户获取更准确的本地频谱数据,并使用空间模型,如克里格和高斯过程构建无线电地图。这种人群感知系统的成功假定了一些吸引用户参与的激励机制。在这项工作中,我们考虑的情况下,构建无线电环境地图的平台,使一次性提供给选定的用户,并收集数据,从那些接受报价。我们基于预期效用(EU)最大化设计定价机制,其中EU捕获无线电映射性能(位置和数据质量)、人群感知成本和报价结果的不确定性(即,可能的过期和拒绝)。具体来说,我们考虑顺序提供,其中一个最好的价格报价发送给最好的用户在每一轮,和批量提供,其中一批多个报价在每一轮。对于后者,我们表明,欧盟是次模的离散域,并提出了一种机制,首先固定的定价规则和选择用户的基础上无约束次模最大化(USM),然后比较不同的定价规则,以找到最好的一批提供在每一轮。我们表明,基于USM的用户选择有可证明的性能保证。建议的机制进行评估和比较效用最大化为基础的基线机制。

英文摘要:

Networking on white spaces (i.e., locally unused spectrum) relies on active monitoring of spectrum usage. Spectrum databases based on empirical radio propagation models are widely adopted but shown to be error-prone, since they do not account for built environments like trees and man-made buildings. As an economically viable option, crowd-sensed radio mapping acquires more accurate local spectrum data from mobile users and constructs radio maps using spatial models such as Kriging and Gaussian Process. Success of such crowd-sensing systems presumes some incentive mechanisms to attract user participation. In this work, we consider the scenario where the platform who constructs radio environment maps makes one-time offers to selected users, and collects data from those who accept the offers. We design pricing mechanisms based on expected utility (EU) maximization, where EU captures the tradeoff between radio mapping performance (location and data quality), crowd-sensing cost and uncertainty in offer outcomes (i.e., possible expiration and rejection). Specifically, we consider sequential offering, where one best price offer is sent to the best user in each round, and batched offering, where a batch of multiple offers are made in each round. For the later, we show that EU is submodular in the discrete domain, and propose a mechanism that first fixes the pricing rule and selects users based on Unconstrained Submodular Maximization (USM); it then compares different pricing rules to find the best batch of offers in each round. We show that USM-based user selection has provable performance guarantee. Proposed mechanisms are evaluated and compared against utility-maximization-based baseline mechanisms.

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