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arXiv 1611.02547econ.GNq-fin.ECq-fin.MF
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战略性非可再生资源的最优开采与税收:一个微分博弈方法

Optimal Extraction and Taxation of Strategic Natural Resources: A Differential Game Approach

Towson University(陶森大学)

Moustapha Pemy

AI总结:

本文研究了非可再生战略性资源的最优开采与税收问题,通过微分博弈方法分析开采公司与政府监管机构的博弈,推导出纳什均衡解及闭式解的最优开采与税收率。

摘要:

本文研究了非可再生战略性资源的最优开采与税收问题。已知主要战略资源如石油、天然气、铀、铜等的市场价格随全球经济和季节性宏观经济参数随机波动,这些价值通过马尔可夫切换莱维过程建模。我们将此问题表述为一个微分博弈。该微分博弈的两个参与者是旨在最大化其开采活动收益的采矿公司以及负责监管和征税的政府机构。我们证明了纳什均衡的存在。相应的哈密尔顿-雅各比-伊萨克斯方程被完全求解,得到了价值函数以及最优开采和税收率的闭式解。一个数值例子用于说明我们的发现。

英文摘要:

This paper studies the optimal extraction and taxation of nonrenewable natural resources. It is well known that the market values of the main strategic resources such as oil, natural gas, uranium, copper,..., etc, fluctuate randomly following global and seasonal macroeconomic parameters, these values are modeled using Markov switching Lévy processes. We formulate this problem as a differential game. The two players of this differential game are the mining company whose aim is to maximize the revenues generated from its extracting activities and the government agency in charge of regulating and taxing natural resources. We prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium. The corresponding Hamilton Jacobi Isaacs equations are completely solved and the value functions as well as the optimal extraction and taxation rates are derived in closed-form. A Numerical example is presented to illustrate our findings.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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